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A SUBLIMINAL CHANNEL IN CODES FOR AUTHENTICATION WITHOUT SECRECY
Jennifer Seberry*
Department of Computer Science
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N.S.W. 2006
Abstract
G.J. Simmons has advanced the concept of using authentication in an
open channel to actually convey information. We review the use of the
knapsack problem for public codes and explore the use of Shamir's method
for a signature only knapsack to convey messages.
Introduction
Simmons describes subverting authentication to carry secret information when the message-signature pair (M, C) is transported by a neutral
or hostile medium on an open channel. Simmons describes how a warden
might pennit a trustee (or say the Red Cross) to carry an open communication between X and Y in the hope that he can deceive at least one into
accepting as a genuine communication
(a) a fraudulent message created by the warden, or
(b) a modification of a genuine message.
X and Y accept the use of an open channel and a potentially hostile
transporter in order to have any communication at all but insist on a
signature or authentication attached to the communication.
The model can be described by the following diagram.
Initiator
sends
message
with signature

OPEN CHANNEL
(data link, telephone, telex,
trustee, third person)

Receiver
, checks
signature
given public
key

As Simmons notes, there can be many valid signatures for one message,
and if the signature space can be partitioned. information can be
conveyed by the choice of signature.
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Authenti ca ti on
(function A)
CiA = M.¥i.

o

Signatures
Shami r' s Method
We first review Shamir's knapsack code for authentication without
secrecy.
H is k x 2k random (0, 1) matrix,
M is the message,
Mis M written in binary with digits reversed to form a k-bit number;
the method solves

HA "

[U

(mod oi

to form A" (a •... ,a )T (since H;s k x 2k, HA gives k equations in 2k
1
2k
unknowns and so there is freedom to arbitrarily choose k of the coordinates of A).
The transmission procedure can be represented diagramatically as
Public
k!!y

A,o

Transmitter
signforms c
C = MH,
H secret

transmit on
open channel
)

(M, Ci

../'

message

"'-

Receiver (or
adjudicator)
authenticates
CA = M (mod n).

signature

The method works because

M (mod nl,

but to thwart the system it is necessary to solve CA = M (mod n), where
A and M are known. which is precisely the knapsack problem.
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Added Security in Shamir's Method
Nevertheless, security may be lessened if an observer obtains many
sets of (A. n. Mi' C ) and can deduce H. So Shamir suggested choosing
i
a 1 x 2k random binary vector and fonning
MI
ci

C2

M-RAorM=M1+RA
j;j-lH
giving CIA'" MIHA '" MI
I
C + R.

Diagramatically we now have
Public
A. "

Transmi tter
forms C2

transmi ts
over open channel
(M. ',)

•

Authenicator
forms
C2A '" M

This method works because
C A '" {C l + R)A '" CIA + RA '" MIHA + RA
2
'" MI + RA (mod n)

M.
A Subliminal Message?
We note there are at least 22k C such that CiA" M. Hence i f we
i
can recover R or part of R we can send a subliminal message in our
transmitted pair (M. C2 ).
Now we suppose the message has been transmitted over an open
channel using Shamir's signature scheme. The hostile or neutral
transporter can check C2A '" M. but we assume the receiver knows
everything the transmitter knows except the random 1 x 2k binary
vector R. Thus the receiver knows M, H, C • A. n. Hence the receiver
2
can form

C '" MH
I
and knows
C2 -~ Cl + R '" MIH + R.

(1 )

The receiver must solve this equation to find R.and this is
equivalent to solving the knapsack problem.
A Trapdoor to Recover the Message

To solve for R we need a trapdoor. Suppose there exists a (lx2k)
vector B such that HB " 0; then equation (1) becomes on multiplying by B
C B '" MIHB + RB '" RB{mod n).
2

3'

Hence. if in addition B is superincreasing we can solve for R.
Diagramatically
Publi c

transmit on
open ch·annel (M, Cz)

Form
signatur

A, "

"

Secret

,

Authenticate
M " CZA
Subliminal
sol ve

M, B

Example:

CZB " RB
to find R
-

1

M = Z. M = 01. M

Public
A=(1,Z,3,O)

3(mod 5), C2

Signature
CZ,,(3,3,I,4)

(3. 3, I, 4)

transmit
(' , (3,3,1,4)

n = 5

Secret

Authenticate

3+6+3+0
, ',A · 12(mod
·

5)

• M

Subl iminal
sol ve
:CZB
3+6+4+32
O(mod 5)
R
(1,0.1.0)
or (0,1,0,1)
or (1,1.1.1)

'M.[02-l0]'
2 1 1-1 :
T'
: B "(1.Z.4.8) :

:
.

To be precise R" (0.1,0.1). RZ " (1,0,1,0), R3 " (1,1,1,1) correspond to
the Signatures C1 = (0,1,0,1), C2 = (3.3.1.4) and C3 " (1,3,0.1) of the
message M = 2 and we need to re-encipher to establish which solution for
R corresponds to the subliminal message R.
For added security, the elements of Hand B can be permuted. or B
could be modified using modular arithmetic, as proposed by Merkle and
Hellman [2].
Conclusion
If a suitable secret matrix H. not necessarily binary, and a secret
easy to solve knapsack vector B such that HB = 0 exists, then Shamir's
signature only knapsack authentication scheme can be modified to carry
secret messages. This method appears to be more secure than the
original knapsack encoding schemes as the third party is presumably
unaware that any secret information is being conveyed. Furthermore,
both the secret encipherment matrix H and solving knapsack B are not
made public.
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